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Booming Western interest in mindfulness and meditation has signifi-
cantly mainstreamed breath and breathing practices. Mobile apps guiding
breath-focused meditation are democratising, more or less carefully,
earlier Buddhist intuitions of a tight, looping relation between body and
mind, breath and mental states. Cognitive sciences too are starting to take
the link between breathing and consciousness seriously. Breath is treated,
for example, both as a symptom of stress disorders (such as hyperventila-
tion in anxiety or OCD)1 and a possible attenuating cure for distressing
mental states.2 The therapeutic power of breathing is also key to the
working of sensory deprivation technologies such as floatation tanks3 or
sonic cradles.4
The cross-methodological benefits of looking at Buddhist practices,
and at the relationship between breath and consciousness, for a better
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understanding of the human mind have been advocated by neurophe-
nomenologists and philosophers of the cognitive sciences such as Fran-
cisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Owen Flanagan.5 Within this intercul-
tural scientific agenda, breath is considered as a way to access an ‘open
awareness’6 of pre-reflective, minimal, foundational levels of conscious-
ness and subjectivity. More than a century ago William James reflected
on the intimacy of breath and consciousness by venturing the even more
radical idea that our background feeling of a unified consciousness is actu-
ally materially anchored in, if not equivalent to, our breath. This is a
mysterious claim; yet one that can today be illuminated by, and integrated
with, contemporary scientific frameworks.
Whether technologically enhanced in artificial spaces or modulated
in natural meditative environments, focussed breathing is therefore
conducive to novel psychological states. Thanks to the regulation of
breathing patterns, patterns in our thinking are not just affected, but
revealed, together with their entanglement with respiration. Bodily
proprioception and cognitive introspection thus converge in a mutual,
looping modulation that discloses a dynamic relationship between biolog-
ical and cognitive domains (or what this essay will describe it as ‘biocog-
nitive feedback’).7 What makes this reciprocal feedback possible is the
structural intimacy and co-dependence of body and mind, in line with
contemporary post-Cartesian cognitive sciences that see cognition as
deeply embodied and shaped by actions, including the enactment of
different breathing patterns.8
This essay investigates the co-dependent intimacy between breath and
cognition as represented, explored, and complicated in the narrative work
of Samuel Beckett. Some of Beckett’s fictional environments, notably
from the 1950s onwards, might indeed feel to his readers or audience
like sensory deprivation tanks. Nothing there can be seen clearly, and
therefore something or someone in the end appears or, as in What Where
(1983), ‘reappears’.9 Such works include, for example, The Unnamable
(1953), where the narrating voice begins as a planet floating in a cosmic
void (or so it pictures itself because ‘how can one be sure in such a dark-
ness?’)10 while hallucinating presences from Beckett’s imagistic universe;
or Company (1980), which can also be experienced as a sustained solitary
training in blinded flotation. Here a character is horizontally lying ‘on
his back in the dark’, when this sensory indeterminacy is lit by projected
images from the character’s past. Together with emergent autobiograph-
ical visions, however, he also gradually attunes to minimal proprioceptive
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knowledge, and notably to the sound of his breath (‘Apart from the voice
and the faint sound of his breath there is no sound. None at least that he
can hear. This he can tell by the faint sound of his breath’). In line with
models of biocognitive regulatory feedback between breath and cogni-
tion, he simultaneously also accesses minimal states of consciousness (‘in
the dark in that dim mind’).11
Sensory deprivation is thus to Beckett’s characters (and, vicariously,
to his readers and audience) generative of new perceptual and atten-
tional modes. This enhanced, regressive attention slowly makes them
better acquainted with primary sensations as cognitive and physiological
organisms. What they access, this essay will argue, is the restless biocogni-
tive feedback activity between minds and bodies, including resonances
or frictions between patterns of breathing and states of conscious-
ness. In this proprioceptive-introspective new attentional mode, the
relationship between breath and consciousness is revealed, in Beckett’s
work, as a complex, fraught intimacy. Beckett notoriously devoted an
entire piece, albeit performatively brief, to the act of breathing (Breath,
1969).12 This work has received extensive critical attention, including
a recent full-length monograph.13 Less explicit, more nested, incre-
mentally distributed, and cross-medially explored references to breath
and consciousness in Beckett’s work have received comparatively little
attention. This essay will therefore avoid an analysis of Beckett’s most
celebrated (but also more symbolic or metaphorical) tribute to breath, to
investigate his subtler exploration of breath’s intimacy with consciousness
and cognition against models of their relation as formulated by classic and
contemporary cognitive science.
The ‘I-Breathe’: Agency, Time-Consciousness,
and Biocognitive Tempos
Let us begin with William James’ radical view of ‘consciousness-as-breath’
to evaluate how it can be set in dialogue with Beckett’s modelling of
biocognitive feedback. James’ model requires gradual unpacking and
speculative interpretation to introduce aspects of consciousness and
breath that are key to understanding more contemporary models. In
his Principles of Psychology (1890) James attempted multiple metaphor-
ical descriptions to capture the nature, essence, and phenomenology
of consciousness. The most famous of these sometimes conflicting
metaphors is the idea of consciousness as a ‘stream’.14 With this image
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James attacked previous conceptualisations of consciousness as a jointed
sequence of discrete thoughts. This static and mechanical view did not
account, James argued, for the unified, dynamic flowing of consciousness,
because consciousness ‘does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. […]
It is nothing jointed; it flows. A “river” or a “stream” are the metaphors
by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter let us
call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life’.15 The
image of a stream helped James to highlight the lack of gaps in subjec-
tive experience, as well as to assign to consciousness an agency of its own
(‘it flows’); thus, accounting also for subjective experiences beyond our
control (e.g., mind-wandering).
The impact of James’ metaphor for psychology, and even more for
literary studies, can hardly be overstated. What is less acknowledged is
that, only a few years later, James grew deeply dissatisfied with this model.
More specifically, and quite surprisingly for the putative father of the
field of consciousness study, he felt that the very concept of conscious-
ness needed to be eliminated. In his essay ‘Does Consciousness Exist?’
(1904), he begins with a lapidary eradication of the concept by stating
that consciousness ‘is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place
among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere
echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing “soul” upon the
air of philosophy’.16 What follows is a landmark example of James’ new
radical empiricist method, in which he interrogates the reasons behind
the resilience of a concept defining such a diaphanous object of research.
In doing so, however, and in spite of indulging in some analogical
exemplifications, he refrains from devising new metaphors.
Metaphors such as the stream have previously been used by James ‘to
negotiate ethereal explanations for consciousness with bodily processes’.17
This is actually what, according to embodied cognitive theories of figu-
rative language,18 most metaphors do: in attempting to capture or to
explore a more volatile or abstract phenomenon (the target of the
metaphor; here, consciousness), metaphors project into it a more concrete
domain (the source; here, the physical experience of a stream of water).
In his later essay, however, James is keen to specify that he actually had
‘mistrusted’ consciousness as a target phenomenon or entity ‘for the past
twenty years’, and that through consciousness metaphors he only ‘tried to
give [his students] its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience’. Not
anymore, however, because he claims that we should dismiss altogether
the existence of consciousness as a distinct target, since ‘[i]t seems to me
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that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded’. James
is aware that dismissing consciousness might sound absurd, but he says
it will be less so if the usual epistemic role attributed to consciousness
is transferred to thoughts themselves: what we call consciousness, James
says, is a ‘function in experience that thoughts perform’ and ‘that function
is knowing. “Consciousness” is supposed necessary to explain that things
not only are, but get reported, are known’.19 For James, thoughts them-
selves can perform this epistemic function, by getting to know each other
in reciprocal relations. The question is then what happens, in this rejection
of the conceptual relevance of consciousness, to the phenomenolog-
ical sense of a unified, sometimes agentively autonomous, flowing of
conscious life that was captured by the image of the stream? Where
are these qualities coming from? James’ non-metaphorical answer is that
they are actually generated by phenomenological biocognitive feedback
coming from another unified, partly involuntary process: our breathing
activity. The conclusion of his radical essay deserves full citation:
I am as confident as I am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking
(which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name
for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of
my breathing. The ‘I think’ which Kant said must be able to accompany all
my objects, is the ‘I breathe’ which actually does accompany them. There
are other internal facts besides breathing (intracephalic muscular adjust-
ments, etc., of which I have said a word in my larger Psychology), and
these increase the assets of ‘consciousness,’ so far as the latter is subject to
immediate perception; but breath, which was ever the original of ‘spirit,’
breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am
persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the
entity known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while
thoughts in the concrete are fully real.20
It is important not to consider this conclusion as another metaphor-
ical descriptor for consciousness. Here James is suggesting rather that
the phenomenological qualities we attribute to consciousness are instead
(not also) to be found in the process of breathing. The reason we care-
lessly conceptualise consciousness as a separate entity, James says, is that
bodily states, and chiefly breathing, generate feedback into our qual-
itative experience of mental states. We then erroneously consider the
latter as having properties that are instead projected (phenomenologically,
not metaphorically) by the former. This means that if we look more care-
fully at our immediate perception of breathing, we should find qualities
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that we usually attribute to consciousness. This might seem far-fetched,
but on closer scrutiny the two processes share a number of constitutive
elements.
The first can be individuated in the particularly shifty agency of
both breathing and consciousness. Breath, as well as consciousness, is a
diaphanous process: a process we mostly live through, and which goes on
in the background of our experience without us having to be in control
of it, or being able fully to stop by sheer will. This agentive autonomy
is also at the core of the felt escorting quality of consciousness, which
accompanies our thoughts and mental states without us being able to
control entirely its background patterns, or to shut it down apart from
when falling asleep. For James, it seems that feedback from the semi-
voluntary agency of breathing feeds into conscious thinking, and informs
its phenomenological properties. Related to this agentive autonomy,
James’ reconceptualisation of the Cartesian cogito as a misnomer for the
‘I-Breathe’ prompts us to look into the act of breathing as a possible
contributor to the feeling of a unified temporal continuity of experience.
If we turn to the phenomenology of temporality, or what phenomenolo-
gists call ‘time-consciousness’,21 we can consider whether its structuring
components can be found in the breathing experience too.
Since Husserl’s seminal analysis of human perception of time,
phenomenologists have endorsed his view that the feeling of temporal
flow in experience is rooted in each perception having a ‘retentive’ and
‘protentive’ aspect. Taking musical notes as an exemplification, Husserl
suggested that the reason we perceive a unified stream of notes as a
melody is that each impression of a note presents itself with a ‘retention’
of what just passed and a ‘protention’ of what is likely to follow.22 Time-
consciousness therefore feels continuous because of these two crucial
phenomenological edges in each conscious perception. If we are to
find in breathing the Ur-model of time-consciousness, retention and
protention can be seen to have phenomenological foundational roots
in the process of inspiration and expiration. Each retentive inhalation
ends in a protentive horizon of expiration, and vice versa. The bodily
breathing cycle is therefore ordered by a pendulum of retentive-protentive
moments that might feed back into our feeling of a temporal continuity
of consciousness.
Together with agency and temporality, a third element that breathing
shares with what we think of as our consciousness is presenting
different tempos. Abnormal patterns of breathing such as hyperventilation
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might resonate, for instance, with accelerated, hyper-reflexive patterns of
thinking.23 In his radical eradication of consciousness, however, James
would probably suggest that, even if biocognitive feedback between
breath and thoughts (thoughts that are, for James, real) is occurring, it is
only through our perception of an altered breathing that we perceive an
analogous unified, altered tempo in our consciousness (the latter being,
for James, the fictitious outcome of breathing feedback).
James’ empiricist evaluation of the relationship between breath and
consciousness ends in a full phenomenological overlapping of the
two processes; or better, in subsuming phenomenological aspects of
consciousness (agency, temporality, and tempos) into the enactive expe-
rience of breathing. For him, the intimate co-dependency turns out to
be an identity. This does not rule out the importance of biocognitive
feedback; if anything, it reinforces the phenomenological impact, but it
makes biocognitive feedback asymmetrical and unidirectional. Its role in
the ‘I-Breathe’ assigns to bodily respiration a phenomenological priority
and the sole ontological validity. It is breath, not consciousness, whose
agency, temporality, and tempos envelop our thoughts.
Beckett only had an indirect and cursory knowledge of William
James.24 And yet, James’ equation of thinking with breath seems at
first neatly to match Beckett’s modelling of the biocognitive relationship
between consciousness and breathing in relation to agency, temporality,
and rhythmic tempos. Throughout his entire corpus, in fact, we find char-
acters suffering the impossibility of agentively controlling and temporally
stopping a consciousness that keeps going on with frantic tempos. As
in James’ model, often these qualities do not just resemble or mirror
bodily patterns of breathing, but they seem experienced, in biocognitive
synchronies, as bodily patterns. In Texts for Nothing (written 1950–
1951), for instance, we have an unnamed character who is not just
comparing, but synchronically equating thinking and breathing, ‘so given
am I to thinking with my breath’.25 By the same token, full breath-
lessness is at times synchronically experienced as a pleasant silencing of
consciousness, for example by the protagonist of the short story The
Calmative (written in 1946) who, in his ‘distant refuge’, feels finally at
rest with his ‘head bowed, weak, breathless, calm, free’.26 Another char-
acter in Texts for Nothing wishes his ‘breath [to] fail better’, to reach a
state where the mind also will be silent (‘to be silent’): a condition that
will also shut down the epistemic function of knowing that we usually
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attribute to consciousness (‘I’ll be silent, I’ll know I’m silence, no, in the
silence you can’t know’).27
Even by an external, ‘heterophenomenological’ perspective’,28 the way
Beckett’s characters breathe is an embodied, material index indicative
of the altered tempo of their mental struggles. In Not I (1972), for
instance, a lit mouth in a darkened stage channels a cascade of thoughts
through breathing patterns at the limit of human performative possi-
bilities. The hyperventilating required of the actress marks patterns of
hyper-reflexive anxiety at the level of the contents. In a letter to the
director Alan Schneider about this play, Beckett wrote how he saw ‘her
speech [as] a purely buccal phenomenon without mental control and
understanding’.29 Here Beckett seems to be touching upon the sense
of a lack of agency in consciousness, which he links, as James would
have it, to a lack of control of breathing tempo: ‘I hear it breathless,
urgent, feverish, rhythmic, panting along, without undue concern with
intelligibility. Addressed less to the understanding than to the nerves
of the audience which should in a sense share her bewilderment’.30 In
a biocognitive synchronic view of consciousness-as-breath, the panting
respiration of Not I is the only unifying process that grants cohesion to
otherwise centripetal, disjointed thoughts. It is a panting breath, not a
streaming consciousness, which pushes thoughts temporally forward, in
steady acceleration. There is no separate, reflective consciousness taking
these thoughts as epistemic objects, and Beckett wanted the enactive
experience of a panting breathing to be the primary, material index of
frantic states of mind.
Beckett had modelled a similar panting consciousness a few years
before in How It Is (1961), this time in the novelistic medium. Assuming
that literary narratives require readers’ silent subvocalising of the text,31 in
How It Is readers are forced to a more direct, sensorimotor enactive expe-
rience of consciousness as bodily articulated. In this highly experimental
novel that has only the shadow skeleton of a standard plot (in Beck-
ett’s words, ‘A “man” is lying panting in the mud and dark murmuring
his “life” as he hears it obscurely uttered by a voice inside him’),32 the
primary meaning seems to be found in the very experience of the articula-
tory efforts in subvocalising these panting words and/as thoughts. When
Robert Pinget received a copy of the original French version of the text
(Comment C’est ) in 1960, he reported how this subvocalising effort was
testing the limit of the reader, and daunting any prospect of translation.
In his account of a conversation he had with Beckett he explains how he
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told him ‘that for him [the third] is the weakest part. I agree, but one
breathes more easily in it. The gasping in the first two parts is unbear-
able’.33 In 1960 Patrick Magee also manifested worries about how to
openly vocalise the text in a public performance. The only help Beckett
thought he could offer was to supplement the lack of punctuation in the
novel by marking rhythms, while suggesting, via his editor Barney Rosset,
that ‘[a]ll he can do is gasp it out very short of breath, into a micro-
phone if possible, and hope for the best. I have marked the rhythms on
his copy’.34 The rhythmic percussion of breathed words, in fact, has no
diacritical signals of rest, but only typographical spaces between blocks.
These are arguably the moments when, as we are told, ‘the panting
stops’35 and therefore markers of longer inhaling gaps between panting
gasps of thoughts. It seems that, through formal manipulations of the
narrative medium, Beckett has managed to force readers, performers, and
translators to a material experience of consciousness as a panting breath
close to the synchronic model promoted by James. If we look at the
contents that are frantically breathed into the characters, however, this
model seems to be only partly explanatory of Beckett’s exploration of the
link between consciousness and breath.
Similar to Not I , in fact, the contents of these thoughts are flashes
from the character’s life that are pushed forward with an agency that
the character disowns. More specifically, these thoughts, we are told, are
coming from above: from a voice ‘once without quaqua on all sides then
within me when the panting stops’. The novel therefore discloses a vertical
cognitive architecture of levels that complicates the idea that what we
are panting through is a single, biocognitively synchronic Jamesian layer
of a breathing consciousness. Early commentators have already stressed
how the mud can be considered as an extended metaphor transforming
consciousness into a place or space traversed by the character; and how its
geography seems located at the bottom of unspecified geological layers.
Ruby Cohn, for instance, claims that ‘[m]ud is an inspired metaphor for
consciousness—warm and traversable. Above the novel’s mud is life in
the light, with its dreams, memories, and fantasies, but the mud itself is
a performative medium: curtains can open within it, as in the theater;
images and scenes can vanish through cinematic blackouts.’36 I endorse
Cohn’s interpretation, which in the framework we are advancing can be
reconceptualised as follows: the mud does not just stand for conscious-
ness, but is a modelling solution that allowed Beckett to introduce an
enactive performance of consciousness as biocognitively linked to breath.
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However, even if the mud is the viscous material that gives panting
the right phenomenological feeling of ‘pushing against’ some agentive
imperative, it seems it is not the mud itself that generates the retentive-
protentive movement. The imperative of panting forward comes from
some other level, and the mud can rather be said to allow a performance
of an asynchrony between the level of panting and the agentive source
of the panting driving tempo. It seems therefore that James’ model of
consciousness-as-breath, while it has a lot to offer to Beckett’s fictional
modelling of the biocognitive feedback between breath and conscious-
ness, cannot account in full for the asynchronous divorce in their primary
and primitive intimacy. We need to find models accounting for different
levels of interaction between breath and consciousness, for models spatial-
ising, as Beckett does, different kinds of consciousness, and set them in




Such models can be found in contemporary cognitive sciences, including
Buddhist-inspired cognitive scientific frameworks. Instead of simplifying
or dissolving the problem of consciousness into a single level having
unidirectional biocognitive feedback (as in the ‘consciousness-as-breath’
model in James), contemporary cognitive sciences promote a multilevel
view of different kinds of consciousness. Multilevel models of conscious-
ness have taken up different names in different thinkers or approaches.
All of them share, however, a distinction between more bodily, tempo-
rally local, pre-reflective stages or states, on which higher stages or
states are building to produce reflective, autobiographical, temporally
extended feelings of continuity for the organism. Once this architecture
is established, biocognitive feedback between lower and higher levels may
occur.
The primary, pre-reflective type of consciousness has been variously
defined as a ‘core’37 or ‘minimal’38 stage and state. Here, the organism
has only a ‘thin’ or ‘experiential’39 sense of being a bodily self, moving
in time. On top of this eminently bodily, phenomenologically thin
state, an ‘extended’ level hosting higher states of consciousness arises:
this is the level of thoughts, episodic memories, mental imagery, auto-
biographical narratives, leading to the more conceptual continuity of an
‘autobiographical self’40 spanning larger portions of time. Core or thin
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levels are, in this account, necessary for more extended or autobiograph-
ical levels of consciousness to emerge. Usually, we are neither aware of
this nested architecture nor of biocognitive feedback between levels.
What Buddhist-inspired cognitive models of consciousness add to this
picture is the possibility of training ourselves in cultivating subtler degrees
of awareness of, and an attentional navigation across, these levels. As
Thompson points out, however, ‘subtler or deeper aspects of conscious-
ness aren’t apparent to the ordinary untrained mind; they take a high
degree of meditative awareness to discern’.41 By training our atten-
tion to breathing we can progress, or regress, within this continuum of
awareness towards a subtler sense of the nested structure of conscious
levels as well as of their biocognitive intermodulation and potentially
asynchronous patterns. By attuning to breathing, we can magnetise our
attention away from higher levels of thoughts, images, and concepts (that
we usually feel as the only constitutive elements of our life and self)
towards more primordial feelings of core aliveness. We can move, in
short, from extended levels of consciousness down to core bodily states
of primary awareness, and this can potentially send slowing, regulatory
feedback (as it were) from the bottom up.
This multilevel model of consciousness seems more capable of
accounting for asynchronous biocognitive feedback within Beckett’s char-
acters. It gives a hermeneutic, spatial structure to map their attempts to
move away from higher forms of consciousness towards minimal bodily
feelings. Since Beckett’s first novelistic efforts, in fact, we find charac-
ters not only thinking with their breath, but trying to alter thinking by
modulating breathing patterns. In Dream of Fair to Middling Women
(written in 1932, published posthumously in 1992), we see the protago-
nist, Belacqua, training himself to regress into a meditative darkness, away
from his restless thoughts. In what reads like a wonderful slapstick rendi-
tion of a self-taught meditational practice, we assist at his active attempts
to manipulate biocognitive feedback between bodily and mental states,
beginning with breathing patterns:
He trained his little brain to hold its breath, he made covenants of all kinds
with his senses, he forced the lids of the little brain down against the flaring
bric-à-brac, in every imaginable way he flogged on his coenaesthesis to
enwomb him, to exclude the bric-à-brac and expunge his consciousness. He
learned how with his knuckles to press torrents of violet from his eyeballs,
he lay in his skin on his belly on the bed, his face crushed grossly into
446 MARCO BERNINI
the pillow, pressing down towards the bearings of the earth with all the
pitiful little weight of his inertia, for hours and hours, until he would begin
and all things to descend, ponderously and softly to lapse downwards through
darkness, he and the bed and the room and the world. All for nothing.
He was grotesque, wanting to ‘troglodyse’ himself, worse than grotesque.
It was impossible to switch off the inward glare, wilfully to suppress the
bureaucratic mind. It was stupid to imagine that he could be organised as
Limbo and wombtomb, worse than stupid.42
It would be possible to interpret the initial reference to the brain’s
breath or lids as metaphorical, ‘psycho-analogical’43 projections of bodily
actions (breathing, closing eyelids) targeting the more abstract domain of
conscious thoughts. Given the following extensive description of actual
physical manoeuvres Belacqua undertakes to silence his higher cogni-
tive apparatus, however, it is better to understand those references as
syncretic, condensed descriptions of biocognitive practices of regula-
tion he concretely operates to move downward levels of consciousness.
Belacqua slows the pace of his brain (a noun that is a synecdoche
for conscious thinking) by actually slowing down his physical breathing
process. This non-metaphorical interpretation of the brain’s breath is rein-
forced by the discovery, a few lines later, that the closing of the brain’s
‘lids’ is also a biocognitive feedback he tries to generate by physically
closing his eyelids, as in sensory deprivation practices.
Belacqua therefore attempts biocognitive covenants between mind and
bodily processes, trying to affect the former through the latter. He does
so in order to move away from the higher, extended level of conscious-
ness (the kind of consciousness he wants to ‘expunge’) down to a more
primitive, core (in his imagery, ‘troglodyte’) level of cognition. This medi-
tative regression, however, is doomed to fail because of an asynchronous
resistance of higher consciousness to biocognitive, upward regulation
coming from bodily senses, breathing patterns included. It is rather the
extended, ‘bureaucratic mind’ which agentively wants the organism to
pant synchronically forward, in accordance with its frantic tempos. If
Belacqua is not attaining any rest in his core level of consciousness we, as
readers, are nonetheless getting a sense of the multilevel structure of his
life as a living human organism; notably, of the asynchronous biocogni-
tive tension between a physical breath that wants to slow down the mind,
and an extended consciousness that wants the body to move in tandem
panting along.
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The transition that Belacqua would like to make, through biocogni-
tive breathing modulations, is therefore one from a higher, agentive, and
autobiographically charged level of consciousness to a lower, core level of
minimal consciousness. This transition can be understood, in contempo-
rary phenomenology of mind, as a downward movement from knowing
to experience. If extended consciousness is the realm of knowledge (e.g.,
beliefs, autobiographical information, conceptual identities, and wilful
control), the core level hosts what Dan Zahavi has called an ‘experiential
self’, which is endowed only with a ‘first-personal presence of experi-
ence’.44 Without or before having to know anything about the content
of experience, the experiential self we found in the core level does not
require a diachronic unity threaded with autobiographical narratives or
conceptual information about the world. It only needs an ‘experiential
continuity’:45 a minimal givenness and presence whose thin temporality is
guaranteed by strictly localised phenomenological retentions and proten-
tions offered to his ‘interoceptive sensitivity’46 by bodily processes such
as breathing patterns. For the experiential self, as Thompson puts it, the
act of breathing is among the ‘self-specifying processes [which] support
an interoceptive sense of self—a feeling from within of one’s body as that
which inhabits the sensorimotor perspective from which one perceives and
acts’.47
This experiential level of subjectivity of our core consciousness is there-
fore the primordial, yet always active ground of our cognitive life. Once
we develop from experiential to epistemic levels of cognition, however,
it mostly becomes hidden below the noisy, verbal, conceptual, imagistic
surface of our extended consciousness. Given the intimate role of breath
in shaping our core consciousness, as Thompson notes, if we want to
regress back to our cognitive foundation ‘it’s therefore no surprise that so
many types of meditation begin with focused attention to the sensation
of the breath as a way of centering our awareness on our embodied being
in the present moment’.48 Moving away from a knowing mode towards
an experiential stance, however, is not just difficult for Belacqua, but even
for proper meditators. This is due to the asynchronous tensions between
the extended level of conscious verbal thinking, beliefs, judgments, or
mental imagery and the core, interoceptive level of bodily processes.
Focused breathing can nonetheless be revealing of such tensions, as
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch explain:
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Breathing is one of the most simple, basic, ever-present bodily activities.
Yet beginning meditators are generally astonished at how difficult it is
to be mindful of even so uncomplex an object. Meditators discover that
mind and body are not coordinated. The body is sitting, but the mind
is seized constantly by thoughts, feelings, inner conversations, daydreams,
fantasies, sleepiness, opinions, theories, judgments about thoughts and feel-
ings, judgments about judgments—a never ending torrent of disconnected
mental events that the meditators do not even realize are occurring except
at those brief instants when they remember what they are doing. Even
when they attempt to return to their object of mindfulness, the breath,
they may discover that they are only thinking about the breath rather than
being mindful of the breath.49
Thinking and breathing, core and extended consciousness, are revealed
to meditators as lacking coordination. Meditators, like Belacqua, attempt
to attune to their core level of consciousness by expunging the seizing,
agentive tempos of thoughts, opinions, judgments, theories, and much
more. This proves difficult, and to Belacqua impossible, because extended
consciousness keeps pulling the organism into higher levels of cognition.
The organism therefore becomes the battlefield of biocognitive feedback
loops coming from both levels, each trying to modulate the other towards
its pace, patterns, and state.
This way, meditators become aware of how the original, ontogenet-
ically primordial, co-dependent intimacy of breath and consciousness in
core states has evolved into a divorced tension that resists synchronic
convergence and remodulation. Extended and core states develop a
different agency, temporality and tempos set in asynchronous negotia-
tions. Core consciousness, on the one hand, still presents the pulsing
semi-autonomous agency of an organism living in a thin present. The part
of the organism in this state moves forwards at the slower pace of minimal
retentions and protentions, rooted in bodily processes such as inspiration
and expiration. Extended consciousness, instead, has a much more ambi-
tious, temporally thick, and frantic kinetics. It restlessly casts narratives,
beliefs, judgments, and memories retaining the distant past that it projects
into the future.
These two levels coexist in the human organism, and this is why
meditators can attempt to shift from a state of extended knowledge to
a state of experiential mindfulness within themselves. Beckett, however,
after having portrayed self-taught meditators such as Belacqua or Murphy
(1938; who ties himself to a rocking chair to regress into liminal
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states of consciousness)50 decides to explore the asynchronous biocog-
nitive tensions between knowledge and experiential levels by separating
them into distinct agents and agentive positions. Company , for example,
pictures a character lying on his back in the dark, when a mysterious voice
begins telling him ‘of a past. With occasional allusion to a present and
more rarely to a future as for example. You will end as you now are’.
Within the multilevel model of consciousness, the voice can be considered
as coming from the extended level, pulling the one in the dark out of his
core state by the downward channelling of autobiographical memories.
The one in the dark is instead located in a lower, core state (‘Your mind
never active at any time is now even less than ever so. This is the type of
assertion he does not question’),51 whose temporality is thinner than any
narrative, only interoceptively grounded in the retentive and protentive
emissions of his breath.
The short novella seems to spatialise extended and core consciousness
into higher and lower positions, each with its distinct agency, temporality,
and tempos. If the voice at the higher level is relentlessly pushing broader
narrative arches down into the organism, the one in the dark seems
mindfully attuned to the semi-voluntary agency of his breath, infusing
his experience just with a presentified slowed tempo. The plot of the
novella can be summed up as the story of biocognitive feedback, looping
downwards and upwards, without a synchronic resolution. Other texts in
Beckett’s work similarly model the interplay, interpenetration, and fraught
intimacy between extended and core levels as a biocognitive struggle of
distinct agentive positions within the same organism. That Time (1976),
for instance, equally stages three voices coming to an old man, listening
to them with his eyes open and ‘His breath audible, slow and regular ’.
The slow pace of the breath of the character mirrors his minimal respon-
siveness to the voices that, once again, are forcing upon him memories
from his past, ‘back and forth without any break in general flow’.52 This
time we are not given any access to the character’s mind, and the slowed
tempo of his breath is the only index of the asynchronous rhythm of his
core aliveness compared to the incessant pace of his voiced memories.
Both texts therefore model the assault that extended levels of
consciousness are launching towards minimal stages of the organism, and
the resistance opposed by the latter. We assist at biocognitive conflicts
between knowledge and memories that are, through voices, agentively
breathed into the characters (with obvious biblical echoes); and listening
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organisms that are trying to stay attuned to the different, more primor-
dial breathing patterns of core states. These biocognitive downwards and
upwards negotiations can be conceptualised as two different kinds of
breathing mediacies.53 On the higher position, we have the faster, agen-
tive emissions of the breathing voices of memory and knowledge, which
attempt to mediate lower organisms up into extended levels of cognition.
On the lower level, we have organisms attempting to anchor, as medita-
tors do, to breath as a mediating interoceptive signal to silence thoughts,
memories, judgments, beliefs, and so on.
It could be argued that the former kind of informational breath is
more of a metaphoric kind of mediacy compared to the physical breath,
which mediates access to lower core states. James’ idea that our extended
consciousness feels the way it does because of its roots in the reten-
tions and protentions of breathing, however, can explain why Beckett
decided to render even higher levels of cognition as having breathing
patterns. There is another reason, though, that can cast further light on
why Beckett opted to model the mediacy of breathing thoughts as voices.
Elsewhere, I have argued that this may be due to Beckett’s modelling
the dynamic of inner speech, and its role in verbalising knowledge into
a pre-reflective, lower state of the organism.54 As cognitive psycholog-
ical research on inner speech shows,55 our inner conversations situate
us both in the position of the producer and the receiver of knowledge
about ourselves and about the world. As a producer, we are located in the
extended level that takes agentive charge of the information to be chan-
nelled. As a receiver, or, as Beckett’s fictional models define it, a listener,
we are more experientially hearing knowledge about ourselves and about
the world. We become an experiential object of conversation.
The dynamic structure of inner speech is therefore isomorphic to respi-
ration. In a looping circle, we listen as we inspire; and we internally talk
as we expire. The inhaling moment is thus equivalent to the breathing
mediacy through which an autobiographical life is channelled into a lower
organism. This core organism would feel, as a meditator does, as if
thoughts, images, beliefs, and judgments have been pushed on him; as
a listener who then has to exhale some lesson imparted to him. This
is the kind of phenomenological report we read in The Unnamable, in
which the narrator is constantly disowning the contents of his narrative
by explaining how he is only exhaling a lesson (‘They gave me courses on
love, on intelligence, most precious, most precious. They also taught me
to count, and even to reason’) that has been breathed into him (‘They
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blow me up with their voices, like a balloon, and even as I collapse it’s
them I hear’).56
In Beckett’s work across different media, we therefore assist, and
vicariously undertake, what it is like to be an experiential core self asyn-
chronically battling against the agency of thoughts, beliefs, judgment, and
images that core selves are forced to inhale and then exhale at acceler-
ated tempos. They discharge the contents of an extended consciousness
(‘a pensum to discharge’)57 that commands them to pant forward, away
from more primitive and primary patterns of breathing and consciousness.
As James explains in his Talks to Teachers (1899), sometimes conscious-
ness discharges in outer behaviours: ‘there is no sort of consciousness
whatever, be it sensation, feeling, or idea, which does not directly and of
itself tend to discharge into some motor effect. […] It may be only an
alteration of the heart-beats or breathing’.58 This seems to be the kind
of motoric discharge of extended states in works like Not I, How It Is,
and The Unnamable. If extended and core consciousness have different
agency, temporality, and tempos (hence some of the limits of James’
model), the former might tyrannously force its patterns onto the latter,
which then becomes a state of non-agentive exhalation of inhaled knowl-
edge (as in Not I , ‘just the birth cry to get her going … breathing …
then no more till this’;59 or in Ceiling , ‘Dull with breath. Endless breath.
Endless ending breath.’).60 Accordingly, the breathing voices in Beckett’s
work are perceived by the experiential characters as masters, guardians,
judges, or tyrants (‘my college of tyrants’)61 with asymmetric knowledge
compared to the experiential subjects.
Breath is therefore key to Beckett’s exploration of asynchronous
biocognitive feedback between levels of knowledge and levels of experi-
ence in conscious human organisms. Different agency, temporality, and
tempos in different levels of consciousness present different breathing
patterns in his work. Patterns of breath are either an index of hectically
discharged knowledge, or a core, pulsing signal of experiential resistance
to that knowledge by the organism. Intruding knowledge or experiential
mindfulness, however, are not the only options for focussed breathing
meditation, nor do they seem to be for Beckett’s characters. A third, ulti-
mate attentional shift awaits the skilful meditator: an access to a mode
of consciousness behind and beyond extended and experiential states.
This further state is what Thompson describes as ‘open awareness’, which
usually begins with a focus on breathing and then ‘takes the form of
witnessing thoughts, emotions, and sensations as they arise from moment
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to moment, and observing their qualities’.62 When a meditator reaches
this stage, she is neither in the extended nor in the core state, but detaches
from both to watch unjudgmentally their biocognitive feedback from an
outside stance.
While in this state, the organism is aware of both levels and of
their reciprocal negotiations ‘without identifying with them or with
the self that appears in them.’63 Building on Vipassanā terminology,
Thompson defines open awareness accordingly as ‘non-reactive’, ‘non-
clinging’, or ‘non-grasping’. A state where one simply ‘observes or
witnesses the coming and going of sensory and mental events without
getting caught up in cognitive and emotional reactions’.64 Reworking
the same Vipassanā tradition in analytic philosophical terms, Miri Albahari
calls this deeper level of awareness ‘witness-consciousness’: a further level
which is ‘the raw registration of any experience’.65 Physiological breathing
can therefore initiate the transition from knowledge to experience, and
then itself become part of the broader, subjectless field of experience
of witness-consciousness. Here the organism steps outside biocognitive
synchronies and asynchronies: to some extent it steps outside chronolog-
ical time altogether, watching the clashing of downwards and upwards
feedback as one might watch rainstorms dampening the earth from a
cosmological perspective.
The stupefied, unjudgmental, non-clinging features of witness-
consciousness seem to capture some of the unique qualities of Beckett’s
fictional organisms when they are not discharging thoughts or interocep-
tively attuned to minimal states. At the beginning of The Unnamable,
we find the protagonist unjudgmentally noticing the appearance of two
other protagonists from Beckett’s previous novels: ‘Malone is there. Of
his mortal liveliness little trace remains. He passes before me at doubt-
less regular intervals, unless it is I who pass before him […]. Perhaps it
is Molloy, wearing Malone’s hat. But it is more reasonable to suppose
it is Malone, wearing his own hat. Oh look, there is the first thing,
Malone’s hat.’66 This non-reactive observation of what resemble halluci-
natory perceptions is close to Thompson’s report of his own attaining of
open awareness, where he describes how he ‘slipped into a state where for
some time I watched a parade of unfamiliar faces while I remained aware
of the subtle feeling of the air entering and exiting my nostrils […]. The
faces seemed imaginary—creations of my mind—but also perceptual’.67
Here Thompson is highlighting how he experienced both mental images
and bodily feelings without clinging to them.
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This kind of witnessing distance can be found in several moments
within Beckett’s fictional minds. In one of the Texts for Nothing , the
narrating stance of the character seems remote both from extended and
core levels of consciousness, even if he is still trying to intervene when
‘I say to the body. Up with you now, and I can feel it struggling […]. I
say to the head. Leave it alone, stay quiet, it stops breathing, then pants
on worse than ever’.68 In spite of still caring for how bodily breath and
breathing thoughts modulate each other, the character seems positioned
outside their interaction. More blissful moments of witnessing detach-
ment can be found in Malone Dies (1951), whose narrating protagonist
feels he has trained himself to move beyond any attachment to his bodily
and mental states: ‘All my senses are trained full on me, me. Dark and
silent and stale, I am no prey for them. I am far from the sound of blood
and breath, immured’.69 What makes Malone’s non-reactive distance a
captivating reading experience is precisely his non-clinging curiosity about
the interplay between his old body and his dimming consciousness: ‘My
body does not yet make up his mind. But I fancy it weighs heavier on the
bed, flattens and spreads. My breath, when it comes back, fills the room
with its din, though my chest moves no more than a sleeping child’s. I
open my eyes and gaze unblinkingly and long at the night sky. So a tiny
tot I gaped, first at the novelties, then at the antiquities’.70
More often than not, however, Beckett’s characters are unable to attain
or fully rest in such open awareness. It is rather the audience or readers
who are positioned as witnesses of the incessant, sometimes cruel biocog-
nitive mediacies between extended and core levels within the organism.
Like Buster Keaton in Beckett’s Film (1965), we are vicariously suffering
the impossibility of finding an ‘angle of immunity’71 to shelter ourselves
from the breathing patterns of chasing guardians, masters, tormentors.
As a result, we are panting along within Beckett’s sensory-deprived
storyworlds, which nonetheless turn into meditational technologies for
training our attention to the intimate modulation between breathing and
consciousness.
Conclusion
More could be said about Beckett’s further analogical pairing between
breathing and writing (see, e.g., Malone’s non-agentive writing where
‘the air that breathes through my pages turns them without my know-
ing’;72 or Texts for Nothing, with ‘breathing in and out, with words like
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smoke’)73 or about the guilt of breathing fictional creatures into life (since
‘it is enough to breathe to qualify for asphyxiation’).74 The aim of this
essay was to show, through the interpretive potential of cognitive scientific
models, how Beckett’s exploration of the co-dependent intimacy of breath
and consciousness links to key contemporary problems in consciousness
studies, notably in relation to new enactive accounts of biocognitive feed-
back between higher and lower levels of cognition. In broaching such
a vast topic, interdisciplinarily, and in such a complex author, however,
it is impossible not to feel as Beckett did when discussing with George
Duthuit the relationship between art and subjectivity: ‘All this is literary,
over-simplified, but we breathe as best we can’.75
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